You will notice that whenever one gets to really close quarters with the theory of error one has the puzzle of how to deal with error without assuming the existence of the non-existent. I mean that every theory of error sooner or later wrecks itself by assuming the existence of the non-existent. (Bertrand Russell, LA 89-90)

CHAPTER 3: BELIEFS, FACTS AND CORRESPONDENCE

In Chapter 2 I argued that Russell offered no good reasons to follow him and hold that, in addition to atomic facts there are either negative or general facts. I also argued that Russell was right to refuse to admit molecular facts into the ontology of Logical Atomism. All of this leaves open the possibility that in addition to facts there are what some philosophers would call “propositions.” By the time of his Logical Atomism, Russell had come to doubt that there are propositions. He refused to hold that in addition to facts there are such things as propositions. On Russell’s view, one main reason for accepting propositions in the first place was to solve the problem of false belief, but if propositions are to help solve the problem of false belief, we would seem to need to hold that there are objective falsehoods and that at least some objective falsehoods exist prior to anyone’s actually believing anything. While I feel the aesthetic pull of Russell’s distaste for propositions, but I have another reason for refusing to admit them into the ontology of Revised Factualism.

In this chapter I argue that if, like Russell and certain other philosophers, we hold that there are facts and subscribe to a correspondence theory of truth, then we do not need to hold that, in addition to facts, there are propositions. The ontology of Revised Factualism, like the ontology of Russell’s Logical Atomism contains no propositions.
1. *Naive Factualism.*

Many philosophers maintain that intentionality, or “aboutness,” is a mark, if not the mark, of the mental.¹ Many such philosophers endorse versions of a principle of intentionality which entail that what philosophers have come to call “propositional attitudes,”—mental states such as belief, desire, doubt—have, or are about, objects.² What objects?

One initially attractive answer is offered by *Naive Factualism.* Naive Factualism entails that the objects of such attitudes are facts. What one believes when one believes something is a certain fact. When Paul believes, for example, that John loves Mary, Naive Factualism entails that Paul believes a fact,

\[ f_1 \text{ [loves, John, Mary]} \]

consisting of the *loves*-relation relating John to Mary. According to Naive Factualism, Paul has a belief whose object is fact \( f_1 \). Believing is a relation, and, when Paul believes that John loves Mary, that relation relates the believer, Paul, in this case, to something believed, the fact that John loves Mary. In addition, according to the correspondence theory of truth, this very fact is the fact in virtue of which both Paul’s belief and his sincere utterance of sentence

\[ (1) \text{ John loves Mary} \]

are true.

From our revised factualist perspective, Naive Factualism has at least three attractive features. First, since there are facts, Naive Factualism uses of antecedently available entities;

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¹ The list is lengthy and, among modern and contemporary philosophers, includes Franz Brentano and Jerry Fodor.
² Among others, Bertrand Russell and Alexis Meinong subscribed to such a principle.
Naive Factualism would not be guilty of multiplying entities beyond necessity. Second, certain well-known arguments suggest that if beliefs and the other propositional attitudes have objects, then those objects are complex entities, and facts seem to have a fitting degree of complexity.\(^1\)

Third, Naive Factualism accords with the commonsense view that our beliefs sometimes relate us to the world—the totality of facts—and to things in the world—the constituents of those facts.

Despite these three attractive features, however, Naive Factualism is unacceptable. This is because Naive Factualism fails to accommodate the truism that people sometimes have false beliefs. That is to say, Naive Factualism falls victim to the ancient Problem of False Belief.

In his *Theaetetus*, Plato depicted Socrates raising the Problem of False Belief.

\begin{verbatim}
Socrates And does not he who thinks, think some one thing?
Theaetatus Certainly.
Socrates And does not he who thinks some one thing, think something which is?
Theaetatus I agree.
Socrates Then he who thinks of that which is not, thinks of nothing?
Theaetatus Clearly.
Socrates And he who thinks of nothing, does not think at all?
Theaetatus Obviously.
Socrates Then no one can think that which is not, neither as a self-
\end{verbatim}

existent substance or as a predicate of something else?

(Theaetatus 189)

A couple of millennia later, Bertrand Russell puzzled over a similar problem.

Suppose I take ‘A believes that B loves C’. ‘Othello believes that Desdemona loves Cassio’. There you have a false belief. You have this odd state of affairs that the verb ‘loves’ occurs in that proposition and seems to occur as relating Desdemona to Cassio whereas in fact it does not do so, but yet it does occur as a verb, it does occur in the sort of way that a verb should do. I mean that when A believes that B loves C, you have to have a verb in the place where ‘love’ occurs. You cannot put a substantive in its place. Therefore it is clear that the subordinate verb (i.e., the verb other than believing) is functioning as a verb, and seems to be relating two terms, but as a matter of fact does not when a judgement happens to be false. That is what constituted the puzzle about the nature of belief. You will notice that whenever one gets to really close quarters with the theory of error one has the puzzle of how to deal with error without assuming the existence of the non-existent. I mean that every theory of error sooner or later wrecks itself by assuming the existence of the non-existent. As when I say ‘Desdemona loves Cassio’, it seems as if you have a non-existent love between Desdemona and Cassio. (LA 89-90)

To avoid certain complex subjunctive locutions, let us assume that Othello, Desdemona and

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4 Plato, Theaetatus (189a).
5 Russell, op. cit. pp. 89-90.

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Cassio exist and also that Othello has the false belief that Desdemona loves Cassio. What is the object of Othello’s false belief? Naive Factualism would seem to entail that if Othello’s belief has an object, then that object is a fact,

\[ f_2 \ \text{[loves}^2, \text{Desdemona, Cassio}] \]

consisting of Desdemona loving Cassio. This does not work, however, because, since both Othello’s belief and his utterances of sentence (2) are false, there is no such fact as \( f_2 \). If there were such a fact as \( f_2 \), then, since they would then correspond to a fact, both Othello’s false belief and Othello’s false utterance of (2) would be true. Facts, then, are not the objects of false beliefs, and it seems reasonable to insist that if all beliefs have objects, false beliefs have the same kind of objects as true beliefs. It appears that facts are also not the objects of true beliefs, and, therefore, that Naive Factualism is unacceptable.

1. **Propositionalism.**

If facts are not the objects of beliefs, what kinds of things are the objects of beliefs? As noted above, certain well-known arguments suggest that if beliefs have objects, then those objects are complex entities. Very well, then, exactly what kinds of complex entities are the objects of beliefs? According to **Propositionalism**, the objects of beliefs--of true and of false beliefs alike--as well as of the other “propositional attitudes,” are **propositions**. Propositions are thought to be non-factual, but fact-like, complexes.

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It often seems to one working in this area of Philosophy that there are as many different views about the nature of propositions as there are proponents of the propositional account. Nevertheless, I believe that what I am about to say about the need to hold that there are propositions will apply to any view of propositions that can do what philosophers who subscribe to both the propositional account and the correspondence theory mean to do with propositions. If you disagree, then present your own view of propositions, explain it as fully as I explain the view below, show that it does all that needs to be done, and show that it avoids my eliminative strategy. I think that by the very nature of what propositions need to be in order for you to do what you want to do with them, you will not avoid the claim that you could have done without them.

Henceforth, we are assuming both that the correspondence theory of truth is the correct theory of truth and that we are dealing only with those forms of propositionalism that are conjoined with the correspondence theory of truth. Under these two assumptions, we are trying to determine if there are any good reasons for holding that there are propositions. We begin with the question, “What are propositions?” A typical answer--one offered by propositionalists--is that propositions are “theoretical entities” that play three theoretical roles. First, they are the objects of beliefs and the other attitudes; when one believes something, what one believes is a

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6 For interesting reviews of some of the various alternatives see Richard Gale's "Propositions, Judgments, Sentences and Statements," in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy vol. 6, Macmillian, 1967, pp. 494-505, and Chapter 1 of David Austin's What is the Meaning of "This"?, Cornell University Press, 1990.
proposition, and one’s belief is about x just in case the proposition that one believes is about x. One does not believe something else such as a fact or a sentence, but, instead, one believes a proposition. Second, propositions are the meanings or contents of assertive utterances of declarative sentences; two sentences have, or are used with, the same meaning provided they express, or are used to express, the same proposition. The (propositional) content of a given utterance of a declarative sentence is the proposition that is expressed by that utterance of the sentence. Third, propositions are thought to be the primary bearers of the truth-values, true and false; a given utterance, or a given belief, is true (or false) just in case that utterance expresses, or that belief has as its object, a true (or false) proposition.

These are all nice answers to one question that one might reasonably intend to ask by an utterance of the sentence, “What are propositions?”, and they do give some indication of the power of the propositional account to unify various apparently diverse phenomena, but they are not helpful answers to a different, yet still reasonable, question one might mean to ask by an utterance of the sentence, “What are propositions?” Propositions, like facts, are alleged to be fact-like complexes. We know that the fact that John loves Mary is a complex consisting of the loves-relation, John and Mary, and that this fact exists just in case that relation relates John to Mary. That is an answer to one of the questions one might reasonably mean to ask by the question, “What is the fact that John loves Mary?” This answer is our “What are?” question, does not tell us what we can do with facts, but, rather, tells us about there structure, or nature. It is the kind of answer that understands the question as a call for a kind of analysis.

We want a similar kind of answer to the question, “What is the proposition that John
loves Mary?”, and more generally to the question, “What are propositions?” We seek a kind of analysis of propositions. Presumably, the proposition that John loves Mary is a complex entity, and it is also reasonable to suggest that, like the fact that John loves Mary, the proposition that John loves Mary involves the loves-relation, John and Mary. So far, so good, but we haven’t anything that distinguishes the proposition that John loves Mary from the fact that John loves Mary. How, exactly, does the proposition that John loves Mary differ from the fact that John loves Mary?

Let us assume, tentatively, that any given proposition is an ordered set consisting of an n-place relation followed by n-individuals of types appropriate to that relation. Let us also assume, again tentatively, both that p1, the proposition that John loves Mary, is the ordered set

\[ s_1 = \langle \text{loves}^2, \text{John}, \text{Mary} \rangle \]

and that p2, the proposition that Desdemona loves Cassio, is

\[ s_2 = \langle \text{loves}^2, \text{Desdemona}, \text{Cassio} \rangle. \]

It is important to understand that these assumptions are tentative. In addition, it is important to be clear about just what we are assuming. Our tentative assumptions are, that (1) expresses a proposition and that p1 is the proposition that (1) expresses, that (2) expresses a proposition and that p2 is the proposition that (2) expresses, that p1 is identical to, or is one and the same thing as, the ordered set s1, and that p2 is identical to the ordered set s2.

Note the structural similarity between s1 and fact

\[ f_1 = \langle \text{loves}^2, \text{John}, \text{Mary} \rangle. \]

Both f1 and s1 are complex entities. In addition, if f1 has the degree of complexity required of
the alleged objects of propositional attitudes, then so does s1. So far, so good.

Propositionalism entails both that, because p1 corresponds to a fact, namely f1, p1 is true and that, since p2 fails to correspond to any fact, p2 is false. Paul’s belief that John loves Mary is true in virtue of two things: that it has proposition p1 as its object, and that proposition p1 is true. Othello’s belief that Desdemona loves Cassio is false because of two things: it has proposition p2 as its object and proposition p2 is false. The propositional account also entails both that Paul’s utterance of sentence

(1) John loves Mary

is true because it expresses p1 and p1 is true and that Othello’s utterance of sentence

(2) Desdemona loves Cassio

is false because it expresses p2 and p2 is false. In this way, Propositionalism accounts for the truth and falsity of beliefs as well as the truth and falsity of utterances of sentences. These two jobs need to be done, and the propositional account seems to do them well. In addition, the propositional account accords with versions of the principle of intentionality that require that propositional attitudes have objects. Let us tentatively assume the following version of

Propositionalism:

**Propositionalism:**

P1 There are both propositions and facts,

P2 For any true proposition, p, there is a corresponding fact, f,

P3 There are no facts corresponding to false propositions,
P4 True propositions are true because they correspond to facts and false propositions are false because they fail to correspond to facts.

There is a critical, but often neglected, difference between facts and propositions. In a fact, but not in its corresponding proposition, the component relation relates the other components. In fact

\[ \text{f1 } [\text{loves}^2, \text{John, Mary}] \]

the loves-relation actually relates John to Mary; the loves-relation is the “metaphysical glue” that binds the other two constituents together to form the complex f1. In proposition p1, however, the loves-relation does not relate John to Mary, but is, instead, just another one of the proposition’s constituents. The loves-relation’s doing its job—namely relating—accounts for the unity of fact f1, but the loves-relation’s relating does not account for the unity of proposition p1.

In general, where \( f \) is a fact, \( R \) is the relation that accounts for the unity of \( f \), and \( p \) is a proposition that corresponds to \( f \), although \( R \) is a constituent of \( p \), \( R \) does not account for the unity of \( p \). This is because \( R \) does not occur “relatingly” in \( p \). \( R \) does not occur in \( p \) in such a way as to relate the other components of \( p \). Recall that we asked how the proposition that John loves Mary differs from the fact that John loves Mary. We now seem to have an answer: the loves-relation is a relating constituent in the fact but a mere, non-relating constituent in the proposition.

Some may find talk of relations actually relating, or occurring relatingly, as opposed to occurring merely as constituents, or occurring unrelatingly, intolerably vague. I do not. Furthermore, I suspect that anyone who fails to comprehend such talk does not understand what
propositions are supposed to be. I can, however, be more explicit about these locutions. Where $p$ is a proposition, $f$ is its corresponding fact, and $R$ is the relating, relational component of $f$, that $R$ relates in $f$ but not in $p$ entails both that $f$ would not exist if $R$ did not relate $f$’s other components and that $p$ could exist even if $f$, in virtue of $R$’s not relating $f$’s other components, failed to exist. This distinction comes out quite clearly when expressed in the language of possible worlds. That $R$ relates in $f$ but not in $p$ entails both that there is no possible world in which $f$ exists and $R$ does not relate $f$’s other components and that there is a possible world wherein $p$ exists but $f$ does not. (If there are necessary facts, this account won’t quite work; for if a fact is necessary, it will hold or exist in every possible world. To avoid this possible problem, we could restrict our account to just contingent facts and propositions. We could then extend the account to necessary facts by saying that in a necessary fact and its corresponding proposition, the relation enters into the proposition just as it does for propositions that correspond to contingent facts. In fact, few if any of the facts we will have occasion to consider will be necessary facts. For most, if not all, of the facts we shall consider will have at least one contingent constituent and, therefore, will themselves be contingent.)

Recall both fact

$f_1 \ [\text{loves}, \text{John, Mary}]$

and $p_1$, the proposition allegedly expressed by

(1) John loves Mary.

If we are to understand this crucial difference between fact $f_1$ and proposition $p_1$, we must understand that there are possible worlds in which proposition $p_1$ exists but fact $f_1$ does not. At
all such worlds, though certainly not at all worlds, the loves-relation, John, and Mary exist, but, at all such worlds, since the loves-relation fails to relate John to Mary, f₁ fails to exist. Proposition p₁ exists at such worlds; for its constituents exist at such worlds. p₁ is, however, false at such worlds.

Mary and John are mere contingent beings, and, therefore, both the proposition that John loves Mary and the fact that John loves Mary are mere contingent things—that is, both the proposition and the fact exist in some, but not in all, possible worlds. Moreover, the set of worlds in which the fact that John loves Mary exists is a proper subset of the set of possible worlds in which the proposition that John loves Mary exists, and is, of course, identical to the set of possible worlds in which the proposition that John loves Mary is true. The proposition that John loves Mary exists at every world in which each of its constituents exists; in this crucial way the proposition that John loves Mary differs from the fact that John loves Mary. For there is such a fact—the fact exists—only if the loves-relation relates John to Mary. At worlds in which the proposition exists and where the fact also exists, since there is a corresponding fact, the proposition is true, and at worlds where the proposition exists and the fact does not, since there is no corresponding fact, the proposition is false.

This difference between facts and propositions is essential to Propositionalism’s apparently successful treatment of the problem of false belief. According to the propositional account, at the real world, the object of Othello’s false belief, namely proposition p₂, exists, even though it lacks a corresponding fact. At the real world, the loves-relation—like Desdemona and Cassio—is a constituent of a non-factual complex, i.e., is a constituent of p₂, but the loves-
relation does not actually relate Desdemona to Cassio. For if it did, there would be a corresponding fact, in which case proposition p2, Othello’s utterance of sentence

(2) Desdemona loves Cassio,
as well as Othello’s belief would all be true.

There are possible worlds in which John does not love Mary, but in which Paul believes falsely that John does love Mary. On the propositional account, p1, the proposition expressed by

(1) John loves Mary,
exists at every world in which Paul believes that John loves Mary. There is, however, no possible world at which Paul falsely believes that John loves Mary and at which fact

f1 [loves2, John, Mary]
exists. For at every such world, since there is a fact corresponding to the proposition, the proposition, and therefore any belief having that proposition as an object, is true. Propositions and their corresponding facts, though apparently similarly complex, are not birds of a feather.

The relating relational constituent, functioning as a relation, is the metaphysical glue that binds the other constituents of a fact together when the fact exists. Relations doing their job—relating—account for the unity of the facts in which they occur relationally. What, then, if not its constituent relation, serves as the glue that binds the other constituents of a proposition into a complex, non-factual whole? What accounts for the unity of propositions? Russell despaired of finding a satisfactory answer to this question and consequently rejected the propositional account.

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2. Russell’s Multiple Relation Theory.

When Russell realized that the constituent relation of any given proposition did not relate the proposition’s non-relational constituents, he abandoned the propositional account and developed his Multiple Relation Theory of Belief. Russell’s multiple relation theory entails that beliefs are facts—what I shall call belief-facts—that there are many belief-relations, and that the belief-relation of any given belief-fact is the relation that unites the other constituents of that belief-fact. The belief-relation that enters relationally into a given belief-fact is the metaphysical glue that accounts for the unity of that fact. In The Problems of Philosophy, Russell introduced this view as follows:

The relation involved in judging or believing must, if falsehood is to be duly allowed for, be taken to be a relation between several terms, not between two. When Othello believes that Desdemona loves Cassio, he must not have before his mind a single object, ‘Desdemona’s love for Cassio’, or ‘that Desdemona loves Cassio’, for that would require that there should be objective falsehoods, which subsist independently of any minds; and this, though not logically refutable, is a theory to be avoided if possible. Thus it is easier to account for falsehood if we take judgement to be a relation in which the mind and the various objects concerned all occur severally; that is to say, Desdemona and loving and Cassio must all be terms in the relation which subsists when Othello believes that Desdemona loves Cassio. This relation, therefore, is a relation of four terms, since Othello also is one of the terms of the relation. When we say that it is a relation of four terms, we do not mean that Othello has a certain relation to Desdemona, and has the same
relation to loving and also to Cassio. This may be true of some other relation than believing; but believing, plainly, is not a relation which Othello has to each of the three terms concerned, but to all of them together: there is only one example of the relation of believing involved, but this one example knits together four terms. Thus the actual occurrence, at the moment when Othello is entertaining his belief, is that the relation called ‘believing’ is knitting together into one complex whole the four terms Othello, Desdemona, loving, and Cassio. (PP 125-126)

Consider, for example, Othello’s belief that Desdemona loves Cassio. According to Russell, Othello’s belief, which is one of Othello’s mental states, is a fact that comes into existence when a 4-place belief-relation comes to unite Othello, Desdemona, the loves-relation and Cassio, in just that order. Hence, according to Russell’s multiple relation theory, Othello’s belief is the following belief-fact

\[ b1 \quad [\text{believes}^4, \text{Othello}, \text{Desdemona}, \text{loves}^2, \text{Cassio}]. \]

Revised Factualism entails that the world is the totality of facts, and if there is such a fact as b1, then it is just as much a fact in the totality of facts that constitutes the world as the fact that John loves Mary, the fact that Mary loves Paul, and the fact that Naples is north of Red Bluff.

In the preceding passage, because the example involves the four terms, Othello, Desdemona, loving and Cassio, one might easily come away with the impression that Russell thought that there was just one belief-relation, a four-place belief-relation. This impression, however, should be corrected by a moment’s reflection. For Othello might also believe that Desdemona is beautiful. This belief would be a belief-fact involving just three terms: Othello, the
property of being-beautiful and Desdemona. Therefore, that belief-fact’s belief relation would be a three-place belief-relation. Indeed, Russell’s theory seems to provide that at least in principle there is an n-place belief-relation for any n greater than two.

By the time of his lectures on Logical Atomism, Russell had abandoned both his Multiple Relation Theory and Propositionalism. He abandoned the Multiple Relation Theory because it was at odds with his view that a relation cannot occur in a fact except as a relation. Recall the formulation of Russell’s principle from Chapter Two:

\[ \text{RRT} \quad \text{If } f \text{ is a fact and } R \text{ is a relation, then } R \text{ occurs in, or is a constituent of, } f \text{ only if } R \text{ occurs as a relation in } f. \]

Note that there are two relational constituents in belief-fact $b_1$ [believes\(^4\), Othello, Desdemona, loves\(^2\), Cassio].

There is the four-place belief-relation, believes\(^4\), and the two-place loves-relation, loves\(^2\). Only one of these two relations, namely the belief-relation, actually relates anything in fact $b_1$. This is because the loves-relation occurs in $b_1$ as a non-relating, relational constituent, and, since the belief is false, the loves-relation does not even relate the belief’s other, non-relational constituents.

Clearly, Russell’s Multiple Relation Theory is inconsistent with RRT. Faced with this inconsistency, Russell gave up the theory and retained the principle. The two passages that follow, help us to see that Russell abandoned the Multiple Relation Theory because it is inconsistent with RRT.
I want to try to get an account of the way that a belief is made up. That is not an easy question at all. You cannot make what I shall call a map-in-space of a belief. You can make a map of an atomic fact but not of a belief, for the simple reason that space-relations are always of the atomic sort or complications of the atomic sort. I will try to illustrate what I mean. The point is in connection with there being two verbs in the judgement and with the fact that both verbs have got to occur as verbs, because if a thing is a verb it cannot occur otherwise than as a verb. (PLA 89)

There are really two main things that one wants to notice in this matter that I am treating of just now. The first is the impossibility of treating the proposition believed as an independent entity, entering as a unit into the occurrence of the belief [hence, Propositionalism is rejected], and the other is the impossibility of putting the subordinate verb [in the case of b1, the subordinate verb is “loves”] on the level with its terms as an object term [non-relating constituent] in the belief. That is a point in which I think that the theory of judgement which I set forth once in print some years ago [the Multiple Relation Theory] was a little unduly simple, because I did then treat the object verb as if one could put it as just an object like the terms, as if one could put ‘loves’ on a level with Desdemona and Cassio as a term for the relation ‘believe’. (PLA 91-2)

Having rejected the non-relating, constituent relation as the unifying relation, or metaphysical glue, that forms the objects of beliefs, propositionalists who seek a unifying relation might look to the Multiple Relation Theory and maintain that the belief-relation of any given belief accounts for the unity of that belief’s propositional object. Such a move is certain to
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fail. For, in the first place, propositionalists hold that beliefs have complex, fact-like objects, and on the Multiple Relation Theory there is no one thing to serve as the object of Othello’s belief. Belief fact b₁ won’t do, for b₁ is the belief itself, and however one construes the claim that beliefs have objects, it is implausible to say that beliefs are always their own objects. In fact, it seems plausible that any belief that has a belief for an object is distinct from the belief that is its object. The claim that beliefs are their own objects is antithetic to the propositionalist’s reading of the principle of intentionality, and propositionalists mean to uphold that principle. In the second place, propositionalists conceive of propositions as entities that exist both before and after, as well as whether or not, they are believed. Russell objected to this feature of Propositionalism when he objected to the view that there are what he called “objective falsehoods”. Hence, propositions exist before and after, as well as whether or not, the belief-relation gets into the act. The various belief-relations of the Multiple Relation Theory cannot account for the unity of propositions. The Multiple Relation Theory is not a propositionalist view. It was proposed by Russell in part so that he could avoid commitment to propositions, and it should come as no surprise that it seems inconsistent with the propositional account.

Since neither the belief-relation nor the non-relating constituent relation accounts for the unity of propositions, propositionalists lack an account of what unites the various constituents of propositions. They have no account of the unity of propositions. Faced with this difficulty, propositionalists might insist that the unity of their non-factual complexes be taken as primitive. “Propositions,” they could say, “exist when their constituents exist, and that is the end of the matter.”
This response to our inquiry about the existence conditions for propositions makes it hard to see how to state their identity conditions. For infinitely many things of the same type—namely, set-theoretic things—exist when the constituents of p1 exist. These include the ordered set that we tentatively identified with p1, namely,

\[ s_1 \langle \text{loves}^2, \text{John, Mary} \rangle, \]

as well as the ordered sets

\[ s_3 \langle \text{loves}^2, \text{Mary, John} \rangle, \]
\[ s_4 \langle \text{John, loves}^2, \text{Mary} \rangle, \]
\[ s_5 \langle \text{Mary, loves}^2, \text{John} \rangle, \]
\[ s_6 \langle \text{John, Mary, loves} \rangle, \]
\[ s_7 \langle \text{Mary, John, loves}^2 \rangle, \]

and also the set

\[ s \{ \text{loves}^2, \text{John, Mary} \}. \]

Since there are so many such things that exist when the constituents of p1 exist, taking the unity of propositions as primitive runs the risk of having no way of distinguishing propositions from those other things or from one another. To see this more clearly, let p3 be the proposition that Mary loves John, i.e., the proposition expressed by an utterance of

(3) Mary loves John.

Which, if any, of the preceding set-theoretic objects is p1, that is, which is the proposition expressed by

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(1) John loves Mary,

and which is p3? Recall that p1 was only tentatively identified with the ordered-set s1. We are
asking now which, if any, of the various set-theoretic objects that exist when the elements of set
s exist really is p1, which, if any, really is p3, and if there is a way of deciding which really is p1
and which really is p3. It appears that there is no non-arbitrary way of deciding.

The problem confronting us is not that there are no objects to play the role of p1 or p3.
There are many such set-theoretic objects; in fact, there seem to be too many such objects. We
seem to be suffering an embarrassment of riches. A number of these set-theoretic objects could
play the role of p1 and a number of them could play the role of p3, but we are not interested in
stand-ins. We are trying to determine which if any such set-theoretic object is p1 and which if
any such set-theoretic object is p3. The problem is one of determining which is p1 and which is
p3, and this problem only seems more hopeless when we consider that the above list represents
only a very small sample of an infinitely large set of such objects. Given the other objects that
could play the role of p1, it would be purely arbitrary to identify p1 with s1, rather than with one
of the other available objects. Each of these non-factual complexes has an equally legitimate
claim to the title “the proposition expressed by (1).” Furthermore, it would be purely arbitrary to
identify s1 with p1, rather than with, say, p3; for p3’s claim to identity with s1 is no weaker than
p1’s claim to identity with s1.

It will not help to observe that we can stipulate, say, that p1, the proposition expressed by

(1) John loves Mary,

is
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s1 <loves², John, Mary>,

and that p₃, the proposition expressed by

(3) Mary loves John,

is

s₃ <loves², Mary, John>.

Although we might get considerable mileage from these sorts of stipulative identifications, such stipulations, while they might prove useful, do not answer the question before us now. They do not tell us exactly what is this thing called “the proposition expressed by (1).” After all, we could also stipulate, and gain equal mileage from the stipulation, that p₁ is

s₄ <John, loves², Mary>,

and that p₃ is

s₅ <Mary, loves², John>.

Hence, the fact that we might gain a lot from certain stipulations does not indicate that the stipulations are on the mark. Propositions are looking more and more like creatures of darkness. We should admit that we do not really know either what they are or how they differ from one another.

3. Revised Factualism’s Approach.

If we ought not multiply entities beyond necessity, we should be doubly cautious when it comes to multiplying creatures of darkness beyond necessity. The burden of what remains of this chapter is to show that there was no need to introduce propositions in the first place. For
anything that a correspondence theorist can and should do with propositions and facts can be
done with facts alone. If we continue to hold that there are propositions, then we will violate our
Quinean version of Ockham’s principle.

To see that this is so, we shall take an indirect route through Russell’s Multiple Relation
Theory. Russell’s theory entails that when Othello believes that Desdemona loves Cassio, there
is a belief-fact,

\[ \text{believes}^4, \text{Othello}, \text{Desdemona}, \text{loves}^2, \text{Cassio}, \]

consisting of a 4-place belief-relation relating Othello, Desdemona, the loves-relation, and
Cassio. Saying that when a belief occurs, the belief-relation unites the believer—what Russell
would have called the “subject” of the belief—and the various other things and relations the
belief is about—things that Russell would have called the “objects” of the belief—into a
complex unity—belief-fact \( b1 \)--cries out for further explanation. When Othello came to believe
that Desdemona loves Cassio, something in the world changed. But what and how?

Well, not Desdemona, Cassio, or the loves-relation, at least not internally, and not
initially. For Othello could come to believe that Desdemona loves Cassio even if they were
greatly separated from him in space and time. When Othello came to believe that Desdemona
loved Cassio, what, then, changed? The answer, of course, is that what changed was Othello or
some part of Othello. What part? His brain or some part of his brain. (We could, if necessary, put
what follows in terms of Cartesian minds and states of such minds, but, although I intend that the
view I am developing here be regarded as neutral with respect to the nature of the mind, I shall
stick with brains.) Before he came to believe that Desdemona loves Cassio, Othello was in a
particular brain-state, and when he came to believe that Desdemona loves Cassio, he came to be in a different brain-state. Somehow, Othello’s newly acquired brain-state, which is itself a fact in or about Othello, in conjunction with certain other facts, relates Othello to Desdemona, the loves-relation, and Cassio in such a way that it is correct to report that Othello believes that Desdemona loves Cassio, rather than, say, that Cassio loves Desdemona, or that Desdemona is taller than Cassio, or that Socrates is alive. Something like this must hold in order for it to be correct to attribute to Othello the belief that Desdemona loves Cassio but incorrect to attribute to him those other beliefs. There are certain facts about him, or his brain, together with certain other facts relating constituents of those facts in or about his brain to things, in the world which jointly give rise to Othello’s belief. All this seems to hold on the multiple relation theory.

Can it be otherwise on the propositional account? On the propositional account, in order for Othello to believe p2, the proposition that Desdemona loves Cassio, something either of or in Othello must be related either to p2 or, in some appropriate way, to p2’s constituents. Hence, even on the propositional account, in order for Othello to believe that Desdemona loves Cassio, i.e., in order for him to stand in the propositionalist’s belief-relation to proposition p2, there must be two sets of facts: one set of facts, I shall call them brain-facts, about Othello or his brain, and another set of facts, I shall call them connecting-facts, which relate the constituents of those brain-facts to things in the world—at least to the things in the world that constitute p2.

On the propositional account, sentence

(4) Othello believes that Desdemona loves Cassio,

is true if and only if
(5) Othello stands in the belief-relation to proposition \( p_2 \)
is true. This is because, as propositionalists interpret sentence (3) it asserts that Othello has a
belief which has the proposition expressed by sentence

(2) Desdemona loves Cassio,
namely proposition \( p_2 \), as its object. We have just seen that sentence (5) is true exactly if certain
facts hold: at least one fact about Othello’s brain—\textbf{at least one brain-fact}—and facts connecting
constituents of those brain-facts with the constituents of \( p_2 \)—\textbf{connecting-facts}. If (5) is true if
and only if there are such brain-facts and connecting-facts and (4) is true if and only if (5) is true,
then (4) is true if and only if there are such brain-facts and connecting-facts. And if (4) is true
just in case there are such brain-facts and connecting-facts, then there is no need to talk about
proposition \( p_2 \). It should be apparent that \( p_2 \) is an eliminable middleman, heuristically useful,
perhaps, but ultimately unnecessary. Any propositionalist view that explains how brain-facts and
connecting-facts must be in order for a given person to believe a given proposition, i.e., any fully
developed version of the propositional account, will tell us enough about how the believer is
related to the proposition allegedly believed to enable us ultimately to avoid any mention of the
proposition.

In addition, any fully developed version of the propositional account would permit us
systematically to assign truth-conditions to any brain-fact involved in a belief which allegedly
has a propositional object. The account goes as follows: where \( p \) is a proposition and \( b \) is the
brain-fact that holds of a given believer in virtue of which that believer believes \( p \), then \( b \) is true.
if and only if $p$ is true. 7 Let us assume that $p$ is true, and that $f$ is its corresponding fact. Truth for brain fact $b$, just like truth for proposition $p$, ultimately comes down to correspondence; a brain-fact is true when there is a corresponding fact, and false when there is not. (Obviously, I am assuming here that $p$ is either an atomic proposition or the negation of an atomic proposition. Molecular propositions and general propositions would be handled as suggested by the previous chapter.) The brain-fact that is associated with a given proposition will be true just in case its associated proposition corresponds to a fact, and a brain-associated with a given false proposition will be false when its associated proposition is false. On this account, false brain-facts are false for roughly the same reason that false propositions would be false, if there were propositions, and true brain-facts are true for the same reason that true propositions would be true, if there were propositions. If Propositionalism offers a plausible account of beliefs, and their being true or false, then Revised Factualism is in a position to offer an equally plausible account of beliefs, and their being true or false, with this considerable difference, Revised Factualism does it without resort to propositions.

The same holds for the truth of utterances of sentences. Sentence

(1) John loves Mary

is true, and sentence

(2) Desdemona loves Cassio

7 I do not mean to imply that for any given proposition there is always just one such brain-fact; if there are propositions, then Kripke's Pierre, for example, is related by least two distinct brain-facts to the proposition that London is pretty.
is false. On the propositional account, (1) is true both because it expresses proposition p1 and because p1 is true, and proposition p1 is true because it corresponds to fact f1. Any version of the propositional account that explains how an utterance of sentence (1) gets associated with p1 will tell us enough to enable us to see that an utterance of sentence (1) is true if and only if it corresponds to the very same fact that proposition p1 would be true in virtue of corresponding to. According to Revised Factualism, a given utterance of sentence (1) is true because it corresponds to fact f1. On the propositional account, a given utterance of sentence (2) is false both because it expresses proposition p2 and because p2 is false, and proposition p2 is false because it fails to correspond to the facts. Any version of propositionalism that explains how an utterance of sentence (2) gets to be associated with proposition p2 will tell us enough to allow us to determine that such an utterance it true only if a certain determinant fact obtains—the very fact that would have to obtain in order for p2 to be true. On Revised Factualism, a given utterance of sentence (2) is false because it fails to correspond to the facts. When it comes to the truth and falsehood of utterances of sentences, Revised Factualism is in principle every bit as adequate as the Propositionalism.

It might be helpful to use a very simple model to illustrate what must hold for Othello to believe proposition p2. First, we need at least one brain-fact. Suppose that Othello’s brain-state consists of a number of sub-states. These are the model’s brain-facts. Suppose that fact f3
\[ f3 = [L^2, d, c], \]
a fact in Othello, is one such brain-fact. Fact f3 is a sub-state of Othello’s mind or brain. I am not taking any position on the nature of such facts. I believe that any fully developed, acceptable
form of propositionalism will need to assume, or show, that there are such facts, and I am only assuming what I think any acceptable version of propositionalism will entail. Next, we need some connecting-facts. Let us assume that certain kinds of relations, connecting relations, hold between constituents of brain-facts like f3 and things in the world—between constituents of brain-facts like f3 and constituents of propositions like p2. I am not taking any position on the nature of such connecting relations nor am I offering an account of what how connecting facts come into being; I am only assuming what I think any fully developed version of propositionalism must assume, namely, that there are connecting relations. For now, let us suppose that there is just one such connecting relation, \( R^2 \), and that \( R^2 \) relates or connects \( L^2 \) to the loves-relation, d to Desdemona, and c to Cassio. Hence we have the following connecting-facts relating Othello’s brain-states, or constituents of brain-facts about Othello, to things in the world:

\[
\begin{align*}
  f4 & \quad [R^2, d, \text{Desdemona}], \\
  f5 & \quad [R^2, c, \text{Cassio}], \\
  \text{and} \\
  f6 & \quad [R^2, L^2, \text{loves}^2].
\end{align*}
\]

As I see it, \( L^2 \), d, and c are, in some sense, mental—where being mental does not of necessity exclude being physical. In addition, \( \text{loves}^2 \), Desdemona, and Cassio are not mental. That does not entail that one cannot have a belief about something mental. It just happens to be the case that Othello’s belief that Desdemona loves Cassio is not about anything mental—unless, of course, loving is a purely mental phenomena. From all this it follows that \( R^2 \) is a relation that relates
things mental to things non-mental. It relates entities interior to Othello to entities exterior to
Othello--entities that would exist even if Othello ceased to exist. This does not mean that those
mental things in Othello are not also in the world, and it does not mean that any of the facts in
this little model are not among the facts of the world. Interior things are real things, and facts
involving interior things are real facts. But they cease to exist when Othello ceases to exist.

In this model, Othello believes proposition p2 in virtue of facts f3, f4, f5 and f6, but we
have no need to refer to p2. This is because sentence

(4) Othello believes that Desdemona loves Cassio

is true in virtue of the same facts. In addition, Othello’s belief that Desdemona loves Cassio is
false because brain-fact f3 is false—there is no fact corresponding to f3. Furthermore, an
utterance of sentence

(1) John loves Mary

is true because there is a fact consisting of John loving Mary, and an utterance of sentence (2) is
false because there is no fact consisting of Desdemona loving Cassio. On the propositional
account, an utterance of sentence (1) is true because it expresses proposition p1 and p1 is true in
virtue of corresponding to fact f1. For this to happen some connecting relations must relate
sentence (1), or certain of its constituents, to proposition p1, or certain of its constituents, in such
a way that it is appropriate to say that the utterance of (1) expresses p1, but not appropriate to say
that it expresses the proposition that Mary loves John, the proposition that Paul loves Mary, or
the proposition that Socrates is mortal. These relations will have to isolate or pick out p1 alone
and no other proposition. Given these relations, it will be quite clear to anyone able to determine
what proposition the utterance expresses just what fact would have to exist in order for the proposition to be true.

Of course, no one has done all the work necessary to spell out a theory that determines, for any given utterance, both whether or not it expresses a proposition and, given that it does express some proposition, exactly what proposition it expresses. But if such work were ever done, it would be guided by our pretheoretic intuitions as to just what fact the utterance would need to correspond to in order to be true. Our intuitions about these utterance-to-fact relations will serve as our guides when we develop our theory about the utterance-to-proposition-relations, and it is hard to see why any fully developed account of what propositions our utterances express will not allow us to deal solely in terms of the utterances and the facts, and to ignore the unnecessary, dare I say “shadowy,” middle-realm of propositions.

Our little model can be used to explain why it is not true that Othello believes that Cassio loves Desdemona. Given the connecting-facts f4, f5, and f6, if there were in Othello a brain-fact consisting of $L^2$ relating c to d, i.e., if there were such a fact as

\[ f_7 = [L^2, c, d], \]

then Othello would believe that Cassio loves Desdemona. There is no such fact, however, and, so, there is no such belief.

In addition, this model can be employed to help us to see why identity of relevant brain-states does not entail identity of belief. Let us suppose that another individual, say Twin-Othello, is in exactly the same brain-state as Othello. Despite the fact that they are in the same brain-state, Othello and Twin-Othello need not have all of the same relevant beliefs; for although $f_3$ is a fact
about or in Othello and f3’ is a fact about or in Twin-Othello, and the two facts are identical in type—where types are individuated causally or functionally, Othello and Twin-Othello will have a different beliefs if any of the relevant connecting facts vary in any appropriate way. It should be clear from this that Revised Factualism permits us to offer a fairly simple, and intuitively plausible account of Hilary Putnam’s Twin-Earth example. Let us see how the account goes.

Putnam images an earth-bound person, Oscar, who holds many common beliefs about water. Oscar believes, for example that water is wet. Putnam also imagines a remote planet, Twin-Earth, on which a language sounding and looking like Earthian English is spoken, and on which Oscar has a molecular duplicate, Oscar-2. Oscar-2 is said by his Twin-Earth counterparts to “believe that water is wet.” Now Earth and Twin-Earth are remarkably similar except for one important fact, and all that follows from it, namely on Earth the lakes, rivers and oceans are filled with H₂O—it is the stuff called “water” on Earth—and on Twin-Earth the lakes, rivers and oceans are filled a different, but similarly appearing stuff, whose chemical name is XYZ—XYZ is the stuff called “water” on Twin-Earth. Oscar and Oscar-2 are in identical molecular states—except where Oscar contains H₂O, Oscar-2 contains XYZ. Oscar and Oscar-2 say similar things—utter similar sentences—and have been stimulated in the same ways. They are in functionally identical brain states, yet, and this is precisely what Putnam maintains, they do not have all the same beliefs. Oscar’s “water” beliefs are about H₂O and not about XYZ. Oscar-2’s “water” beliefs are about XYZ and are not about H₂O.

This example works well in terms of the sort of model developed above. Oscar and Oscar-2 have functionally identical brain-facts, but those brain-facts are not connected to the same things
via the connecting relations that help give rise to their beliefs. Oscar has a brain-fact

\[ f_8 \ [W, w] \]

In addition, there is for Oscar a connecting fact

\[ f_9 \ [R^2, w, H_2O] \]

but there is no such connecting fact on Twin-Earth. Similarly, Twin-Earth contains the Oscar-2 brain-fact

\[ f_{10} \ [W, w] \]

and no fact like \( f_9 \), but it does contain a connecting-fact

\[ f_{11} \ [R^2, w, XYZ] \]

Oscar and Oscar-2 are in type-identical brain-states, yet, because they are in situations with different connecting facts, they do not have identical beliefs.

Certainly, things are not as simple as they are in these little models, but there is no reason to think that as our models grow in complexity, so as to more closely approximate the world, they will lose one of their more important features, namely that of explaining how a given believer stands in the belief-relation to a given proposition only if they permit us to avoid references to the proposition. If I am right about this, and previously mentioned considerations about how we would go about developing more accurate and sophisticated propositional models suggest that I am, then there is no need to posit propositions in accounting for the truth of beliefs and utterances of sentences.

Although Revised Factualism’s account is partly inspired by Russell’s Multiple Relation
Theory, there is at least one important difference between the two views. On the Multiple Relation Theory, whenever there is a belief, a belief-relation relates the believer to the various things and relations (or properties) the belief is about. The Multiple Relation Theory entails that each time there is a belief, there is a belief-fact constituted by the belief-relation relating the believer to those other things and relations. On the Multiple Relation Theory, an utterance of sentence

(4) Othello believes that Desdemona loves Cassio

is true because of fact

b1 \{believes\^4, Othello, Desdemona, loves\^2, Cassio\}.

Revised Factualism, however, does not entail that there is such a fact; instead, on Revised Factualism (as modeled above), there is a state of Othello,

f3 \{L\^2, d, c\},

consisting of some relation, L\^2, relating constituents d and c. This brain-fact about, or in, Othello, “mirrors” the fact that would exist if the loves-relation related Desdemona to Cassio. L\^2 is connected to the loves-relation (hence f6), d is connected to Desdemona (hence f4), and c is connected to Cassio (hence f5). Being connected to is not the same thing as being identical to, however, and L\^2 is not identical with the loves-relation, d is not identical with Desdemona, and c is not identical with Cassio. On Revised Factualism, but not on the Multiple Relation Theory, (4) is true even though there is no single fact like b1, with a belief-relation, Othello, Desdemona, the loves-relation, and Cassio as constituents.

It should be clear that Revised Factualism does not preserve versions of the principle of
intentionality which entail that, in addition to the ordinary non-mental things and relations that
beliefs are often about—their objects in the sense of “object” employed by Russell in his
discussions of his Multiple Relation Theory—both true and false beliefs are about fact-like
complexes. Othello’s false belief that Desdemona loves Cassio has Desdemona, the *loves-
relation*, and Cassio for objects, but there is no factual complex, and there need be no
proposition, to serve as its object. Paul’s true belief that John loves Mary is about a fact and also
about that fact’s constituents, but it is not also about some proposition. Hence, although it rejects
propositions, Revised Factualism does not deny that beliefs are among those mental states with
the remarkable property of being about other, sometimes non-mental, things. While my belief
that Saul Kripke is a philosopher is not about a proposition, it is about the non-mental entity,
Saul Kripke, and it is true in virtue of a corresponding non-mental fact. Revised Factualism does
not entail that mental states are not intentional. It entails that there is no need to refer to, or to
posit the existence of, propositions in accounting for the truth or falsity of beliefs and utterances
of sentences.

Some will be shocked to hear that there are false facts. I find nothing shocking about
false facts, and, apparently, neither did Russell. If false propositions and false productions of
sentences do not shock us, why should false facts? The real source of the shock about false facts
is probably our misguided tendency to think of false facts either as non-facts that “want” to be
facts, or as unreal, or non-genuine, facts. On Revised Factualism, both false and true brain-facts
are genuine, real, full-blooded facts. They just happen to be facts with truth-values.

One might object to my claim that all that the propositional account can do can be done
without propositions by arguing that Revised Factualism cannot accommodate certain of our intuitions about necessary truths. Consider for example, p4, the proposition that two plus two equals four. Since propositions exist at every world in which their constituents exist, p4 has a chance of being true at every possible world, and, therefore, p4 has a chance of being necessarily true. This does not seem to hold either for beliefs or utterances; for there are belief-less and utterance-less worlds. Therefore, it would appear to follow that no belief and no utterance will be true at every world, and hence, that no belief and no utterance will be necessarily true. Therefore, Revised Factualism seems to entail that there are necessary truths.

There are a number of fairly difficult issues that would need to be sorted out if we were to discuss this objection thoroughly. I propose, for brevity, to consider only one line of response. The problem, as I see it, is that we have the intuition that there are beliefs and utterances which are not merely (contingently) true; some beliefs and utterances seem to be necessarily true. Yet, surely there are belief-less and utterance-less worlds. Therefore, no belief or utterance exists at every world, and so it would appear to follow that no belief or utterance is true at every possible world. That much we can agree to.

Note that on the sort of propositional account we are considering, proposition p4 is true at a world, w, just in case at w it is a fact that two plus two equals four; that fact, f4, must exist at every world in order for p4 to be true at every world. This is because truth comes down to correspondence with facts. Hence, on the propositional account, an actual world utterance, u, is true at a possible world, w, if and only if there is a proposition, p, such that u actually expresses p and p is true at w. Similarly, on the propositional account, an actual world belief, b, is true at a
world, w, if and only if there is a proposition, p, such that p is the actual object of b and p is true at w. Finally, a proposition, p, is true at world w if and only if at w, there is a fact, f, such that p corresponds to f (at w).

It is noteworthy that on this propositional account, beliefs and utterances can be true at a world even though the world is one in which there are no beliefs or utterances. Hence, it does not appear to follow in order for a belief or an utterance to be true at a world, the belief or utterance has to exist at that world.

Now, when p is a proposition expressed by a real world utterance, u, and p corresponds to an utterance-less world fact f, what is the nature of this correspondence? Is it an intra-world relationship or is it an inner-world relationship. Let us assume, for now that it is an intra-world relationship. This means that p, as an actual world entity, stands is an inter-world correspondence relation to f, an utterance-less world fact. If p can stand in such a relationship to f, then there is no good reason to suppose that the utterance u cannot stand in a similar intra-world relationship to f—especially since u already stands in the actual world’s inner-world correspondence to f.

What, then, if the correspondence relation that p stands in to f is an inner-world relationship? Such a relation would be one that x could stand in to y (at w) only both x and y exist at w.
From a logical point of view, if \( u \) bears relation R to \( p \) and \( p \) bears relation \( R' \) to \( f \), there is a relation, \( R'' \), such that \( u \) bears \( R'' \) to \( f \). Hence, it would appear that an utterance, \( u \), that occurs at world \( w \) can correspond to facts of some other world, \( w' \), even though world \( w' \) is a world in which there are no utterances. The same would seem to be true of beliefs. It seems perfectly clear to me that my actual world utterance of (4) is true at worlds in which there are no utterances and that this is because every such world includes fact \( f_4 \). We know what a given non-actual world would have to be like in order for my actual world utterance of (4) to correspond to that non-actual world’s facts. Hence, it seems to me that there is no problem for Revised Factualism in our intuition that some beliefs and utterances are not merely contingently true.

This discussion is almost certain to raise another issue, and that is the issue of what facts make such beliefs as my belief that I could have been a lawyer true. I am not a lawyer, and therefore if I were to believe that I am a lawyer my belief would be false—there is no fact consisting of my having the property of being a lawyer. One might say, that my belief that I could have been a lawyer is true in virtue of there being a possible world in which it there is a fact consisting of my being a lawyer. Is it in virtue of corresponding to such a fact—a “merely possible fact”—that my could have been belief is true? If so, then isn’t this somehow or other inconsistent with the hard-nosed spirit of Revised Factualism to think that there are such facts? And if not, in virtue of what kinds of facts are such beliefs true when they are true?

The first thing to note here is that, with respect to the issue at hand, Revised Factualism is no worse off than any similarly “hard-nosed” version of Propositionalism when it comes to the truth of my belief that I could have been a lawyer. For the only
forms of Propositionalism we are concerned with in this chapter are those that are conjoined with a correspondence theory of truth, and presumably the same question can be asked about propositions: what fact corresponds to the propositional object of my belief that I could have been a lawyer?

The fact that the Revised Factualist might have a problem with the truth of certain modal statements and beliefs is not a problem for the views expressed in this chapter unless it can be shown that the Propositional-Correspondence theorist does not have a similar problem.


Finally, it might appear that I have tried to solve the problem of false belief. I have made no such attempt. Instead, I have tried to establish that anything the propositional account does that needs to be done, including, perhaps, solving the problem of false belief, can be done by Revised Factualism. I am inclined to believe, but have not tried to show, that the problem of false belief is a pseudo problem that is based on the false belief that all beliefs must have complex objects.\(^8\) I am inclined to think that we should not reply with Theaetatus, “Certainly,” when Socrates asks the question, “And does not he who thinks, think some one thing?” We should, instead, reply that even in the case of false belief, one who thinks, thinks about things, and what one thinks is true only if the things one is thinking about are as one thinks they are.

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\(^8\) I am grateful to William S. Boardman and Ned Markosian for their comments on earlier versions of this chapter.

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