CURRICULUM VITÆ

Dan Alger

                 Office      Department of Economics

              Address      Lawrence University

                                  Appleton, WI 54912-0599

                                  920 832 6735

                                  Dan.Alger@lawrence.edu

                 Home      71 Brentwood Lane

                                  Appleton, WI 54915-7202

                                  920 731 5048

                Education      Ph.D., 1979, Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, managerial economics, dissertation under D. John Roberts

BA, 1972, Lawrence University, (Appleton, Wisconsin),
mathematics and economics

      Professional      2000-present, Associate Professor,

        Experience      Department of Economics, Lawrence University,

                                  Appleton, WI

Teaching interests include game theory and its applications, industrial organization, economic regulation, and microeconomic theory. Research interests include these same areas plus laboratory economics.

1991-2000, Vice President,
Economists Incorporated,
Washington, DC

Primarily provided economic analysis and advice on com­peti­tive issues in regulated industries.   This consulting work involved U.S., Mexi­can, and Venezuelan natural gas and oil pipelines, tele­com­munications in the U.S. and New Zealand, electric power in the south­eastern U.S., and the re­structuring of the Russian oil industry.  Other consulting work had addres­sed the use of competitive rules, competitive joint ventures, and the possible commer­ciali­zation of “smart” markets.

1998, Visiting Scholar,
New Zealand Institute for the Study of Competition and Regulation, Victoria University of Wellington,
New Zealand

Jointly led research project to evaluate recent changes in telecommu­nications regulation in NZ, Australia, the US, the UK, and Sweden plus other secon­dary projects.

1994-1996, Associate Director,
Cybernomics Incorporated,
Tucson, AZ

Attempted to commercialize “smart” markets.

1987-1991, Chief of Industry Analysis Branch,
Office of Economic Policy, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC),
Washington, DC

Responsible for all longer range economic research for the FERC.  Pri­mary topics included natural gas pipeline sec­ondary markets, natural gas pipe­line rate design, com­peti­tive joint ventures, the level of com­petition in vari­ous markets, incentive regulation, undue discrimin­ation, and entry regula­tion.

1988-1991, Lecturer,
Department of Economics, University of Maryland,
College Park, MD

Taught undergraduate and graduate courses in industrial organization.

1980-1987, Economist,
Bureau of Economics, Federal Trade Commission (FTC),
Washington, DC

 (1980-1982, 1985-1987) Responsible for providing the appro­priate economic analysis for antitrust cases.  The primary economic issues addressed were tacit collusion (the most frequent), alternative bidding institutions, and predatory behavior.  (1982-1985) Conducted some fundamental re­search on oligopolistic markets using economic labora­tory experi­ments.

1977-1980, Assistant Professor,
Department of Economics, University of Arizona,
Tucson, AZ

Taught graduate courses on uncertainty and game theory, and undergraduate courses on mathematical economics and intermediate microeconomics theory.

         Papers and      Open Ownership—Not Common Carriage, NZ Institute for the Study

           Publications      of Competition and Regulation, Victoria University, Wellington, New Zealand, 1999.

Telecommunications Network Elements with Market Power, Power and Telecom Law, CCH, Chicago, 1999(3):3-8.

Relative Costs of Local Telephony Across Five Countries, NZ Institute for the Study of Competition and Regulation, Victoria University, Wellington, New Zealand, 1999.

The Scope of Deregulation for Natural Gas Pipelines and the “Workable Competition” Standard, in New Horizons in Natural Gas Deregulation, J. Kalt and J. Ellig, eds., Greenwood, 85-106, 1996.

Allowing More Entry, Regulation, 1996(2):4-5.

Reducing Telecommunications Regulation using Com­peti­tive Joint Ventures, presented at Telecommunica­tions Policy Research Conference, 1995.

Market-based Regulation of Natural Gas Pipelines (with M. Toman), Journal of Regulatory Economics, 2(3):263-280, 1990.

Effective Economic Research for Public Policy, presented at Olin Conference, Princeton, November, 1989.

A Policy Context for FERC-sponsored Laboratory Experi­ments Concerning Market-based Regulation of Natural Gas Pipe­lines, FERC OEP Technical Report 88-1 (com­panion to Tech­nical Reports 88-2 and 88-3 describing the experiments and their results), 1988.

Laboratory Tests of Equilibrium Predictions with Disequi­librium Data, Review of Economic Studies, 54(1):105-146, 1987.

Investigating Oligopolies Within the Laboratory, FTC Bureau of Economics Report, 1986.

Markets Where Firms Choose Both Prices and Quantities, PhD dissertation, Northwestern, 1979.

         Testimony     

             at the FERC:      Transwestern Pipeline Co., Docket No. RP93-34-000; assessing market power in short-term natural gas transportation.

Natural Gas Pipeline Company of America, Docket No. RP93-36-000; assessing market power in short-term natural gas transportation.

Williams Pipe Line Co., Docket Nos. IS90-21-000 et al; assessing market power in oil pipeline transportation and recommending incentive regula­tion scheme for markets not shown to be competitive.

at state regulatory     Iowa, Minnesota, Ohio, Indiana — testimony for AT&T and MCI on the

      commissions:      Hatfield model for implementing the Telecom­munica­tions Act of 1996.

  in federal court:      Spartan Intrastate Pipeline System et al N. Michigan Consolidated Gas Co. et al, Case Number 96-70903, U.S. District Court, Eastern District of Michigan;  assessing market definition, market power, and anticompetitive effect.

                 Other      Refereed for: American Economic Review, Rand Journal, Review of

      Professional      Economic Studies, Econometrica, Journal of Economic Theory, Journal

                 Activities      of Industrial Organization, International Journal of Industrial Organ­ization, Energy Journal, Journal of Economic Surveys, JAI Press, Reason Magazine, National Science Foundation.

Dissertation advisor for Susan Braman, Theory and Application of Competitive Joint Ventures, Georgetown University, 1992; and Mary Barcella, The Cost Structure and Efficiency of Natural Gas Distribution Companies, University of Maryland, 1992.

Regular presentations at professional and industry meetings  (including conferences for the American Economic Association, Econometric Society, Economic Science Association, Western Economic Association plus con­ferences for the natural gas pipeline, electric power, and tele­communications industries). Member of American Economic Association, Economic Science Association, Game Theory Society, Econometric Society.